There has been significant interest of late in generating behavior of agents that is interpretable to the human (observer) in the loop. However, the work in this area has typically lacked coherence on the topic, with proposed solutions for "explicable", "legible", "predictable" and "transparent" planning with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, semantics all aimed at some notion of understanding what intentions the observer will ascribe to an agent by observing its behavior. This is also true for the recent works on "security" and "privacy" of plans which are also trying to answer the same question, but from the opposite point of view -i.e. when the agent is trying to hide instead of reveal its intentions. This paper attempts to provide a workable taxonomy of relevant concepts in this exciting and emerging field of inquiry.
Introduction
There has been significant interest in the robotics and planning community of late in developing algorithms that can generate behavior of agents that is interpretable to the human (observer) in the loop. This notion of interpretability can be in terms of goals, plans or even rewards that the observer is able to ascribe to the agent based on observations of the latter. While interpretability remains a significant challenge 1 in developing human-aware AI agents, such as assistive agents, the work in this area has typically lacked coherence on the topic from the community as a whole, even if not in the research agenda of different research groups [Chakraborti et al., 2017a; Dragan, 2017; MacNally et al., 2018] , per se. Indeed, a quick scan of the existing literature reveals algorithms for "explicable", "legible", "predictable" and "transparent" planning with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, semantics. The same can be said of a parallel thread of work on the "deception", "privacy" and "security" of plans. This paper thus attempts to provide a workable taxonomy of relevant concepts that can hopefully provide some clarity and guidance to future researchers looking to work on the topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We will first introduce a general framework for describing problems in the space of "plan interpretability" and outline how existing works have addressed different aspects of this problem in cooperative settings. We will then turn the tables and explore their complementary manifestations in adversarial settings. Finally, we will end with a discussion on gaps in the proposed framework that are yet to be explored in existing literature.
Model differences with the Observer
The key challenge in generating interpretable behavior is the ability to account for the model of the observer. This can be summarized as follows -
• An agent's actions may be uninterpretable when it does not conform to the expectations or predictions engendered by the observer model. Thus, the agent, to plan for interpretable behavior, must not only consider its own model but also the observer model and the differences thereof. [Chakraborti et al., 2017a; Dragan, 2017] This "model" can include the beliefs or state information of the agent, its goals and intentions, its capabilities or even its reward function. It can also include the observation model as well as the computational capability of the observer. A misunderstanding or mismatch on any of those accounts will mean that the plan or policy, as expected by the observer (given their cognitive capabilities), will not be the same as that computed by the agent, and will thus be difficult to interpret from the observer's point of view. We will outline in the rest of this writeup how existing work on the topic addresses one or more of these contributing factors, especially the goals and plans 2 ascribed to the agent by an observer. Table 1 formalizes these considerations in the modeling of the agent A and the observer Θ in terms of - 
terms of a labeling scheme.
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This work specifically looks for j-legible solutions in the offline sense such that • Plan: π is a solution to the planning problem Π emitting an observation sequence o |= π.π is a partial plan whose completion set is denoted by {π}.
state s is reachable from the state s following a plan π subject to the computation model (e.g. δ(I, π, O) → G implies π is an optimal solution to Π); • Observation Model: Ω : a × s → o associates a token emitted for a particular action and next state pair.
Interpretability? Plans versus Goals
An agent model (and the corresponding observer model) thus accounts for their beliefs, goals, capabilities and even computation power. In such a formulation, the notion of completion is intrinsically related to the interpretability question -the completion of a plan in that model is equivalent to whether they are interpretable given the assumptions on the model and computation power of the the observer. The exact nature of the interpretation task may vary. Most of the distinctions surrounding the interpretability 3 of agent behavior deals with the disambiguation of goals versus plans [Dragan et al., 2013] from the point of view of the observer. Explicability We begin with "plan explicability" as introduced in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a; Kulkarni et al., 2018a] .
Explicability measures how close a plan is to the expectations of the observer, given a known goal.
Thus the objective of explicability is to be in the set of solutions to the observer's understanding of a planning problem. In Table 1 , the explicable plan is one that has a completion in both the agent and the observer model. The first constraint requires that the solution solves the agent's planning problem while the latter requires that there exists a plan satisfying the emitted observations that enables a completion in the observer model -e.g. the plan looks optimal to the observer as in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a] . When the observer model is not known Kulkarni et al., 2018a] , as is most often the case, the completion in the observer model is difficult to guarantee. As such, explicability is a spectrum, where closer to completed plans in the observer model can be deemed to be more explicable.
the discussion, unless otherwise mentioned, we will refer to the end of that spectrum, whenever such a plan exists, (e.g. most explicable plan) when we mention an explicable, legible or predictable plan. Figure 1: A simple illustration of the differences between plan explicability, legibility and predictability. In this Gridworld, the agent can travel across cells, but cannot go backwards. Figure 1a illustrates a legible plan (green) in the presence of 3 possible goals of the agent, marked with ?s. The red plan is not legible since all three goals are likely in its initial stages. In the parlance of transparent planning, the first action in the green plan can constitute a transparent plan (having conveyed the goal). Figure 1b illustrates an explicable plan (green) which goes straight to the goal G as we would expect. The red plan may be more favorable to the agent due to its internal constraints (the arm sticking out might hit the wall), but is inexplicable (i.e. sub-optimal) in the observer's model. Finally, Figure 1c illustrates a predictable plan (green) since there is only one possible plan after it performs the first action. In the parlance of t-predictability, this is a 1-predictable plan. The red plans fail to disambiguate among two possible completions of the plan. Note that all the plans shown in Figure 1c are explicable (optimal in the observer's model) but only one of them is predictable -i.e. explicable plans may not be predictable. Similarly, in Figure 1b , the red plan is predictable after the first action (even though not optimal, since there is only one likely completion) but not explicable -i.e. predictable plans may not be explicable. Without a prefix in Figure 1b , the green plan is the only predictable plan.
Predictability. Plan predictability, on the other hand, looks for non-ambiguous completions of a plan prefix [Dragan et al., 2013; Fisac et al., 2018; . Plan predictability reduces ambiguity over possible plans, given a goal. Table 1 highlights this distinction with the additional minimization term over the cardinality of the possible plan set (that satisfies the emitted observations) with completions in the observer model. This makes it clear that predictability is, again, a spectrum andAn explicable plan can be unpredictable.
An example would be when there are multiple explicable plans, i.e. many completions in the observer model, so that there is still work to be done in making sure that the observer can anticipate which plan it is that the agent is going to execute. If this can be achieved, then that specific plan would be both explicable and predictable. Similarly -A predictable plan (in the online setting) can be inexplicable in the offline setting. This is possible when, given a prefix (during online plan execution), the observer can tell exactly what plan the agent is executing but the entire plan is still not one that s/he might expect it to (i.e. it does not follow the completion model of the observer). For example, in [Fisac et al., 2018] the actions in the plan prefix of length t can be arbitrary and inexplicable as long as the postfix is predictable. This is also true for transparent [MacNally et al., 2018] plans as well. This phenomenon is readily seen in [Chakraborti et al., 2018c] where the agent produces suboptimal plans that are easier to predict 4 . Figure 1 provides another example. More on this later in the discussion on online versus offline interactions.
Legibility. So far we have discussed explicability and predictability of plans under the condition of known goals only. Plan legibility, on the other hand, is defined as followsPlan legibility reduces ambiguity over possible goals that are being achieved.
The observer model now includes a set of possible goals or equivalently a set of possible models parameterized by the goal, as shown in Table 1 . Now, in addition to solving the planning problem of the agent (first constraint as before), a legible solution requires that the set of observer models (or goals) where a plan satisfied by the emitted observations has completions (satisfies) is minimized.
The notion of legibility of goals has remained consistent across existing literature [Dragan and Srinivasa, 2013; Dragan et al., 2013; . and is equivalent to the notion of transparency of plans [MacNally et al., 2018] . To the best of our knowledge, plan explicability / predictabil-ity and legibility has not been considered together (i.e. with ambiguity over goals and plans simultaneously).
Interestingly, as Table 1 highlights, even though both predictability and explicability assume known goals, the goal known to the observer may not be the actual true goal of the agent and yet plans may be predictable or explicable. For example, the agent could really be doing something else but also achieve the expected goal with the desired behavior in the process. The ability to communicate enables authors in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a ] to handle expectations under conditions of misunderstood goals as well. However, the notion of explicability remains identical as one of generating expected behavior with a shared understanding of the goal.
Similarly, for legibility to occur, there needs to be only some mapping between the agents goal and the possible goal set which may not contain the real goal of the agent.
Online versus offline interactions.
The actual setup of the interaction -i.e. online or offlinemakes a big difference to the explicability versus predictability discussion. This is because explicability and predictability of a plan are non-monotonic, a plan prefix deemed inexplicable can become explicable with the execution of more actions and vice versa, either due to the observer being an imperfect planner due to computational limitations or due to implicit updates to the mental model based on the observations. The online case of explicability can then be seen in terms of the plan prefix -i.e. if its completion belongs to one of the explicable (completions in the observer model) or not. On the other hand, the offline case does not exist for plan predictability, which is a property of the plan suffix. However, in the online case, before the execution starts (i.e. with no prefix) a predictable plan has to be one of the explicable plans. With a prefix, that may no longer be the case, as discussed above (this is considering the definition explicability in the existing work on the entire plan).
Note that, similar to the concept of predictability, legibility of plans is more useful in the online setting since it may be easy to deduce the real goal from the final state after completion of the plan. Though, even in such cases, when the goals (which are not usually fully specified) are not mutually exclusive, legible plans can help. Like explicability and predictability, legibility also shares the non-monotonicity property.
Motion versus Task Planning
One of the biggest points of difference in many of these works is in the nature of the target domain i.e. motion planning [Dragan and Srinivasa, 2013; Dragan et al., 2013; Dragan et al., 2015] versus task planning Kulkarni et al., 2018a; Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018; MacNally et al., 2018] . From the algorithmic perspective, this is simply differentiated in usual terms -e.g. continuous versus discrete state variables. However, the notion of plan interpretability engenders additional challenges. This is because a reasonable mental model for motion planning 5 5 While this is true for path planning in general, complex trajectory plans of manipulators with high degrees of freedom might still require modeling of observer expectations.
can be assumed to be one that prefers shorter plans and thus need not be modeled explicitly (and thus does not need to be acquired or learned). For task planning in general, this is less straightforward. In fact, work on explicable task planning Kulkarni et al., 2018a; Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018] has aimed to learn this implicit model using feedback from humans on the agent's behavior. A particularly instance of this is when these model are assumed to be identical [MacNally et al., 2018; Kulkarni et al., 2019] (this is the case in motion planning, by default).
Given how humans can have vastly different expectations in the case of task planning, it is unclear how useful mental models learned from crowd feedback (as done in [Zhang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a; Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018] ) can be in the case of individual interactions.
Computational Capability
The discussion is, of course, contingent on the computational capability of the observer, as modeled in the completion function in Table 1 . There has been surprisingly little work to address this. Authors in [Fisac et al., 2018 ] approximated the human model with Boltzmann noisy rationality. Motion planning, again, can permit assumption of "top-K" rationality while the computational model of the human is less clear in the task planning scenarios, i.e. domains with combinatorial properties (one can conceive of, for example, models of depth-bounded humans that constrains the space of plans in the mental model). While almost all of the related work [Chakraborti et al., 2018a; MacNally et al., 2018] has assumed perfectly rational (super-)humans, models learned Kulkarni et al., 2018a ] from feedback from human-subjects are likely to implicitly model computational limitations of the human mental model.
Discussion
Learning the Observation Model. The original work on explicability in task planning and subsequent works that build on it [Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018; Gong and Zhang, 2018] attempt to learn the observer model when it is unknown. This is the only attempt to do so in the existing literature. They postulate that the explicability 6 can be measured in terms of whether the human observer is able to associate higher level semantics to actions in the plan. While this approach has its merits, it also arguably conflates explicability with predictability -e.g. just because someone is able to assign task labels to individual actions in a plan does not necessarily mean they would have expected that plan.
Observability. The concepts of explicability, predictability and legibility are intrinsically related to what is observable. In most of the existing work, the plan has been assumed to be completely observable. When this is not the case, the agent can try to ensure that unexpected actions are not observable and thus still be explicable. Interestingly most of the work in cooperative settings have worked with full observability while highlighting model differences. Later we will see that in the adversarial setting existing work mostly focuses on the observation model while assuming the rest of the agent's model is aligned with that of the observer.
Longitudinal effects. All of the work on the topic of interpretable behavior has, unfortunately, revolved around single, and one-off, interactions and little attention has been given to impact of evolving expectations in longer term interactions. There is some reason to suspect that the need for explicable behavior will diminish as humans become accustomed to the "quirks" of the agent. After all, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, "the world conforms to the unreasonable man"! This is, however, not a concern for legible and predictable behavior since, even with complete model alignment, the topic of coordination remains relevant.
Explanatory actions. In recent work , authors have explored the notion of "explanatory actions" as actions that can have epistemic effects. These are actions that can affect the observer model. Plans that are made explicable with the use of explanatory actions are, of course, never predictable -i.e. one cannot predict that an explanatory action will occur during a behavior, but its presence can make the whole behavior explicable. Thus, in this view, the set of possible explicable plans, not all of them may be predictable. But, as we discussed before, all the predictable plans at the start of plan execution have to be explicable.
Human-agent Collaboration. Note that most of the discussion till now has featured a human as a passive observer. However, in most scenarios, the human is likely to be a collaborator or, at the least, their behavior is going to be contingent on that of the agent. While explicability helps this cause, predictable behavior can arbitrarily (and negatively) effect the human when considered in isolation. Indeed, human factors studies of plan predictability versus legibility [Dragan et al., 2015] are consistent with this concern, demonstrating that legibility is more desirable in a collaborative setting. Recent work [Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018] has started to take these considerations into account.
On preference versus expectations. There is considerable prior art on incorporating human preferences in robotic behavior, or plans in general. Indeed, the distinction between preferences and expectations is rather subtle. The former can be seen as constraints imposed on the plan generation process if the agent wants to contribute to the human's utility -"What would Jesus want me to do?" -while the latter looks at how the agent can adapt its behavior in a manner that the human would expect it to (as required by the human mental model) -"What would Jesus expect me to do?". As we mentioned before, in the case of motion planning, there is often no such distinction. Even in the case of task planning -for example, in "human-aware" planning where an agent decides not to vacuum while the elderly are asleep [Köckemann et al., 2014] sometimes it may be hard to identify where exactly the constraints lie, with preferences ("I don't want vacuuming while I am asleep") or expectations ("I don't expect the agent to be designed to vacuum at odd hours"). Ultimately this distinction might not make a difference algorithmically. The agent would need some process of performing multi-model argumentation (with its own model and the observer model) during its planning process [Chakraborti et al., 2018a] .
The lines do become even more blurred in experiments, unless carefully constructed, where human subjects are asked to label data with their expectation (i.e. how to ensure that they are not providing their preference instead?). Unfortunately, the experimental design in Kulkarni et al., 2018a] is noticeably susceptible to this.
Turning the Tables
So far we have talked about works that aim to reveal the intentions of the agent to an observer. In a cruel twist of "human awareness", the agent can use the human mental model and/or the observation model to hide its intentions as well, in an adversarial sense. In the following, we compare and contrast recent work in the planning community in this direction. Many of the discussions, of course, carry over from our treatise of plan explicability, predictability and legibility.
Goals versus Plans
Similar to the previous discussion on predictability/explicability versus legibility, an agent can consider obfuscation of its goals and/or its plans. The goal obfuscation problem is the inverse of the legibility problem, while plan obfuscation is the inverse of the predictability problem discussed previously. Also similar to the previous discussion, it is easy to see that obfuscation of one (goal or plan) may not necessarily obfuscate the other. Unsurprisingly, they can be viewed under a unified framework, as explored recently in . Most of the existing work in this area has revolved around goal obfuscation (under the various names of privacy, deception and security) as outlined in Table 2 
Motion versus Task Planning
The distinction between motion and task planning again makes an appearance in the techniques used to approach these problems if not in the formulation of the concepts themselves. Particularly, authors in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] arrive at a computationally efficient proxy to the likelihood of possible goals given a state and trajectory that is not necessarily available [Masters and Sardina, 2017a ] to the task planning setting. A similar computation used in turns out to be incomplete.
Online versus Offline Intuitively, the obfuscation problem is much more appealing in the online case since some of the motivation in obfuscating plans (such as in evading a pursuit or escaping surveillance) is lost after the plan is done. This is particularly the case for plan obfuscation in Concept Setting / Agent Perspective Formulation / Existing Literature Comments
This is the inverse of the legibility problem. [ Masters and Sardina, 2017b 
Last Deceptive Point (LDP) defined here (in the context of motion planning) has parallels to the notion of equidistant states in [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] . The latter deals with a general task planning setting. However, the latter deploys a heuristic which makes the planner incomplete.
This work specifically looks for k-ambiguous solutions in the offline sense such that
This is the inverse of the predictability problem.
Plan-Obfuscation
This work specifically looks for l-diverse solutions in the offline sense such that et al., 2019] can also allow this with a slight modification -by generating an observation sequence that the agent wants to adhere to from the decoy goals. case of full observability, if not entirely true for goal obfuscation (c.f. discussion on predictability and legibility in offline settings). However, there is a rich set of problems to explore even in an offline setting ] once the observation model becomes noisy or incomplete. An offline analysis also allows for the determination of prefixes, if not entire plans, that can preserve privacy [Keren et al., 2016] . Most often, partial solutions (or fully obfuscating prefixes) is all that is achievable.
The Observer and the Observation Model
One of the most important variables in this thread of work is the observation model. The notion of obfuscation and privacy immediately follows from settings with partial observability [Keren et al., 2015; . However, as seen in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b; Keren et al., 2014] , these concepts are still relevant to fully observable settings, especially in the online case. The observer model also plays a critical role in this regard. Particularly, some of the surveyed works [Masters and Sardina, 2017b; Keren et al., 2016] have modeled a rational (more powerful) observer where P (G | o ) follows the distribution computed by a plan recognizer (i.e. χ Θ = O'), while others has considered an observer with a complete planner, i.e. P (G | o ) = 1 if a plan exists that satisfies the observation, 0 otherwise (i.e. χ Θ = C). Interestingly, in contrast to explicability or legibility and predictability, in the cases of goal or plan obfuscation, none of the surveyed works have scratched the surface of model differences between the agent and the observer beyond the particulars of the observation and computation model.
The Many Flavors of Security, Privacy, Obfuscation, (Dis-)Simulation and Deception
The most interesting aspects of obfuscating behavior is the different notions of privacy, security and deception. We highlight the salient differences in Figure 2 .
Obfuscation and Privacy These are synonymous in the existing literature [Keren et al., 2016; in attempting to make multiple goals likely or possible given a set of observations. This is an inversion of the legibility problem -as highlighted in Table 2 , the minimizing term has flipped. Authors in [Keren et al., 2016] look at pair-wise likelihood of goals in maintaining privacy, while provide a more general formulation for "k-ambiguous" Figure 2c shows different forms of deceptive behavior [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] in red -in simulation or "hiding the truth" (Figure 2a ) the agent could be going to either of the three possible goals while in dissimulation or "showing the false" (Figure 2b ) the likelihood of a decoy goal is strictly higher than that of the real goal. The green plan in (Figure 2a ) is a truthful plan. Figure 2c illustrates the difference between privacy and security of goal obfuscating plans. Here the observer cannot observe the actions of the agent in the first row of the grid due to occlusions. The red and green plans are both 2-ambiguous [Kulkarni et al., 2019] and privacy preserving [Keren et al., 2016] -the former allows for {G 1 , G 2 , G 3 } while the latter allows for {G 2 , G 3 } as possible goal sets for the agent assumed to be rational. However a secure algorithm cannot flip from the red to the green plan when rerun with G 2 . This is allowed under privacy preserving [Keren et al., 2016] and deceptive plans [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] but not in secure plans [Kulkarni et al., 2018b ] -i.e. the red plan is the only secure 2-ambiguous solution.
solutions. This has implications on the security of the obfuscating algorithm, as we discuss below.
Security and Privacy
The notion of security in plans builds on the concept of "independence of inputs" [Štolba, 2017; Lindell, 2005] which requires (in this specific context) that the planning algorithm return the same output or plan regardless of which obfuscated goal it is run with as the real goal so that an adversary cannot determine the real goal by rerunning the algorithm. Thus -A secure plan is always private.
This imposes an additional constraint to the privacy problem -as highlighted in Table 2 , all possible goals must now lend to the same observation tokens.
Obfuscation and Deception Finally, in goal (or plan) obfuscation, the primary goal is to not reveal the true intentions, but not necessarily actively mislead. This distinction between simulation -"hiding the truth" -versus dissimulation -"showing the false" -was made in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] . In the case of the latter, not only are multiple goals likely given a plan prefix but a decoy goal is also more likely than the real one. Deception, in general, can include both. It is clear from the discussion that -A deceptive plan is always obfuscating, but may or may not be dissimulating.
A more detailed discussion of this distinction can be found in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] .
Discussion
In the following discussion, we make connections to a parallel thread of work -"model reconciliation" -and outline possible directions for future work.
Communication and Model Reconciliation
Most of the discussion in this paper has revolved around communication of intentions (goals or plans) implicitly using behavioral cues. In general, predictable or legible behavior can be seen as a special case of implicit signaling behavior [Gong and Zhang, 2018] when communication is undesired. Foreshadowing certain actions (for example, through the medium of mixed reality [Chakraborti et al., 2018c] ) can considerably help the cause of predictability / legibility and coordination in human-agent interaction. The work on predictable [Fisac et al., 2018] or transparent [MacNally et al., 2018] plans could have similarly deployed speech, stigmergic or, in general, communication actions in the plan prefix. As mentioned before, recent work provides a unified formulation in terms of explanatory actions.
During communication, the agent must be able to address the root cause of inexplicability, i.e. it must be able to explicate parts of the model that differ from the human until they agree that its plan was, in fact, the best plan under the circumstances. This process of explanation, referred to as a process of model reconciliation, has been of significant interest [Chakraborti et al., 2017b; Sreedharan et al., 2018c; Chakraborti et al., 2019] to the community recently.
Particularly when the explicable plan is infeasible, such communication remains the only option for the agent to achieve common ground with the human by, for example, expressing incapability [Raman et al., 2013; Raman and Kress-Gazit, 2013; Briggs and Scheutz, 2015; Kwon et al., 2018] , communicating misunderstandings about its capabilities [Chakraborti et al., 2017b; or even lying and augmenting new goals [Chen and Zhang, 2018] . The latter works are certainly more relevant from the perspective of the second part of the paper which explores obfuscation of intentions instead of revealing them. In fact, plan explicability and plan explanations form a delicate balancing act in "human-aware planning", as explored recently in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a] . A concise survey of the model reconciliation process can be read in [Chakraborti et al., 2018b] .
Further Generalizations
In Tables 1 and 2 we provided a general framework for describing the different aspects of the plan interpretability problem. The table also highlights gaps in the existing literature that can lead to exciting avenues of research in future. The model considered in Tables 1 and 2 , even though quite general in being able to classify the breadth of existing work on the topic, does not quite capture the full scope of the plan interpretability. Below, we motivate a couple of generalizations to the framework presented in Tables 1 and 2 . This was done intentionally so as not overly generalize the overview which already captures all of the surveyed literature.
Observation Model with Epistemic Effects
The observation model used in Tables 1 and 2 is quite general in being able to capture both partial as well as noisy sensor models. This model has been used extensively in the past [Geffner and Bonet, 2013] as well as in many of the works covered in this survey; and provides a particularly elegant sensor model while formulating the planning problem for a single agent. However, when considering an observer in the loop, one should be cognizant of the effects of observations on the observer model -i.e. epistemic effects of actions. In recent work this has been explored in the context of implicit model updates on the part of the observer by means of "explanatory actions". One can conceive a more richer observation model that captures such epistemic effects of the actions of an agent on the observer model.
Preference Measure on Plan or Goal Set
The notion of legibility and obfuscation Masters and Sardina, 2017b; Keren et al., 2016] has largely considered the computation of a set of plans or goals as the desired consequence of a behavior, with additional preferences on the cardinality of that set in certain cases (e.g. predictability). Interestingly, in the solution for plan-legibility or predictability, authors in look at "l-diverse" and "m-similar" solutions that can equally apply to the goal obfuscation and legibility cases as well. In general, the minimization or maximization term over the plan or goal sets in Tables 1 and 2 can be replaced by a function over the preferences of the observer towards the agent's achievement (execution) of any particular goal (plan) in the possible goal (plan) set, with cardinality being a special case of that function. More on this below.
An Active / Semi-Passive Observer
All the work surveyed here consider a passive observer. The full scope of the interpretability problem is likely to include a more capable observer. This can be a semi-passive observeri.e. one that can change the observation model only (in a sense reversal of the "sensor cloaking" problem explored in [Keren et al., 2016] ), for example, to improved observability by going to higher ground -to a fully active observer with their own goals and actions, with the ability to even assist or impede the agent from achieving its goals. This is likely to effect the relative importance of agent behaviors (e.g. is predictability more important than legibility in a collaborative setting? [Dragan et al., 2015] ) and also effect the preference measure as discussed above (e.g. a surveillance scenario makes certain behaviors in the completions set more important to recognize, and hence to obfuscate, than others).
Unified Approach to Interpretable Behavior
As we mentioned before, existing work has only looked at the different notions of interpretable behavior in isolation. Designing these behaviors is likely to become more challenging as we consider the effects of one or more of these behaviors simultaneously.
For example, what would it mean to be explicable or predictable when there is ambiguity over the agent's goals? A legible plan given a goal might be an explicable plan for another goal. From our previous discussion regarding the fact that any of these behaviors can exist with or without the other, it will be interesting to see how they can exist simultaneously. Further, given that some of these behaviors are predicated on the notion of rationality on the agent model only (explicability) and others are not (legibility and predictability), it is unclear how the observer may be modeled once the belief of rationality has been suspended (for example, due to inexplicable but legible behavior).
Behaviors versus Plans
Though we alluded to this distinction very briefly at the start of the paper, our discussion has mostly been confined to analysis of behaviors -i.e. one particular observed instantiation of a plan or policy. In particular, a plan -which can be seen as a set of constraints on behavior -engenders a candidate set of behaviors [Kambhampati et al., 1996] some of which may have certain interpretable properties while others may not. However, this also means that an algorithm that can capture the "X"-ability of a plan can also do so for a particular behavior it models since in the worst case a behavior is also a plan that has a singular candidate completion. A general treatment of a plan can be very useful in the offline setting -e.g. in decision-support [Sengupta et al., 2017] where human decision-makers are deliberating over possible plans with the support from an automated planner. Unfortunately, interpretability of such plans has received very little attention beyond explanation generation [Smith, 2012; Fox et al., 2017; Borgo et al., 2018] .
Conclusion
In conclusion, we looked at a variety of interpretable behaviors of an agent which provides a rich set of directives to consider while designing agents that can account for the observer model in their decision making processes. We also saw how the ability to model and anticipate interpretability of its own behavior can be dual-use -i.e. the agent can use this to either reveal or obfuscate its intentions to the observer. We compared and contrasted existing literature that has tackled various aspects of this problem and provided a unified framework for precise specification of these (often confused) ideas. We also highlighted gaps in existing work and directions for future research. Finally, in this survey we have focused on the interpretability of behavior only, and the role of privacy and obfuscation in that context only. There is a rich body of work in the planning community that has explored these concepts in the context of information sharing in multi-agent planning [Brafman, 2015; Stolba, 2017] that can provide additional insights towards a more general of formulation of privacy preservation and obfuscation in a joint planning scenario.
